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A B S T R A C T   
The climate crisis and the global economic impact of the Covid-19 crisis occur against a background of slowing growth and widening inequalities, which together 
imply an urgent need for a new environmentally sustainable and inclusive approach to growth. Investments in “clean” innovation and its diffusion are key to shaping 
this, accompanied by investments in complementary assets including sustainable infrastructure, and human, natural and social capital which will not only help 
achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, but will also improve productivity, living standards and the prospects of individuals. In this article, we draw on the 
theoretical and empirical evidence on the opportunities, drivers and policies for innovation-led sustainable growth. We highlight the importance of a coordinated set 
of long-term policies and institutions that can enable and foster private sector investments in clean innovation and assets quickly and at scale. In doing so, we draw 
inspiration from Chris Freeman’s work on the system-wide drivers of innovation, and his early vision of achieving environmental sustainability by reorienting 
growth.   
Introduction 
The climate crisis and the global economic impact of the Covid-19 
crisis have occurred against a background of slowing growth and 
widening inequalities. The pandemic hit a precarious system exposing 
its fragilities; indeed, humanity’s impacts on ecosystems made a 
pandemic more likely. A new environmentally sustainable and inclusive 
approach to growth is required in response to these twin crises and to the 
weaknesses that produced them. Investment in innovation and its 
diffusion will be key to shaping this, accompanied by investments in 
complementary assets across sustainable infrastructure, and human, 
natural and social capital which together will not only help achieve net- 
zero greenhouse gas emissions, but also transform prospects and living 
standards around the world. 
Urgent action is required, at scale and across the whole economy. 
Any substantial delay in managing climate change will put a 2◦C tem-
perature target for global warming out of reach, let alone the 1.5◦C we 
should be seeking, given that we now understand that the risks 
embodied in 2◦C are so much greater than 1.5◦C (IPCC, 2018). Delayed 
recovery from the Covid-19 health and economic crises will involve 
extended unemployment that risks endangering social cohesion and 
scarring education and work opportunities, particularly for young peo-
ple. Technological change must be radical to enable the decarbonisation 
of economies in just three decades and drive sustainable increases in 
productivity and living standards. 
This article examines ideas and evidence on how policies and in-
stitutions can enable and foster private sector investment in sustainable 
and productive assets at the scale and pace required to tackle climate 
change and simultaneously achieve a strong economic recovery and 
growth into the future.1 While our focus is on policies in high-income 
economies operating on the global innovation frontier, interactions 
with and implications for sustainable development in poorer countries 
are highlighted. We also set out a research agenda on the key areas 
where further work is required. 
The fundamental definition of sustainability is for this generation to 
offer the next generation opportunities in terms of well-being that are at 
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least as good as those which they had, assuming that the next generation 
behaves in a similar way to those that follow.2 By “sustainable growth”, 
we mean growth that is environmentally sustainable, driven by a zero- 
carbon transition that increases underlying strength and productivity 
across physical, knowledge, human, natural and social capital assets – 
and therefore can be sustained in the long run. The rise of populism and 
anti-globalisation sentiment in many countries has highlighted the 
importance of ensuring that the opportunities and benefits of economic 
growth are distributed across society. A zero-carbon transition can both 
boost productivity and growth and avoid severe climate change impacts 
that will hit the poorest and most vulnerable hardest. Lessons from 
history suggest that this transition, as it combines with technological 
change more broadly, will not automatically deliver inclusive growth 
(Rydge et al., 2018). But with the appropriate forward-looking institu-
tional frameworks and policy mechanisms in place, the zero-carbon 
transition can deliver not only sustainable and more inclusive growth, 
but also higher rates of growth compared with a high-carbon counter-
factual. This article discusses sustainable and inclusive growth, and the 
zero-carbon transition, in this context. “Sustainable”, “clean” or “green” 
growth, and the innovation required to get us there are used more or less 
interchangeably, although our emphasis would be on sustainability. 
Throughout this article, we draw upon a number of strands of Chris 
Freeman’s pioneering work, including that which has built an under-
standing of the drivers of innovation and its diffusion and how these 
relate to institutional or organisational factors in an innovation system, 
his analysis of major waves of technical progress and their evolution, his 
emphasis on inter-disciplinarity in the study of innovation, and on data 
to inform the development of theoretical approaches. Indeed, our main 
message is very much aligned with Freeman’s vision of environmental 
sustainability which was to be achieved by reorienting growth, rather 
than stopping it (Cole et al., 1973). In 1992, at the time of the Rio Earth 
Summit which, inter alia, established the UNFCCC, five years before the 
Kyoto protocol was agreed, Freeman argued that sustainability could be 
achieved through reorienting the R&D system and through major 
institutional change (Perez, 2014). More specifically, he asserted that 
“The ICT [information and communications technology] paradigm can 
be shaped and steered in an environmentally friendly direction. This was 
not true of the previous paradigm which was based on mass production 
and the exploitation of cheap oil” (Freeman, 1992). 
Nearly three decades have passed, and digital technologies have 
created even more potential for resource efficiency and productivity 
gains (key examples in the UK context include the application of smart 
grids to energy networks and automated manufacturing techniques3). 
However, it is clear that the world is moving far too slowly for the 
achievement of the Paris 2015 UNFCCC target (“well below 2◦C”) and 
that climate action must be accelerated in order to avoid catastrophic 
and irreversible damage (IPCC, 2018). The next decade is critical. 
Choices made on investments in infrastructure, innovation and com-
plementary assets now will either create lock-in to high emissions or 
enable reorientation towards a low-carbon growth path, which can be 
both sustainable and inclusive. And it can and must be resilient to the 
climate change which is now unavoidable. Global ambitions were raised 
in the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) of 
the UNFCCC in Paris, and COP26 hosted this year (2021) in Glasgow will 
be critical in terms of driving action. 
So far, the devastating impact of the Covid-19 crisis appears to have 
strengthened resolve to invest in sustainable innovation and infra-
structure, with many countries setting out plans for a “green recovery”. 
But this must be converted to robust and coordinated policies and in-
vestments at real scale and pace. There are lessons in the global response 
to the pandemic, which has highlighted the power of R&D in the 
development of Covid-19 vaccines and treatments, and also the impor-
tance of the diffusion of existing inventions in the adoption of digital 
technologies that have helped businesses (Riom and Valero, 2020) and 
individuals adapt to social distancing. In addition, Covid-19 has shown 
how rapidly we can change if we recognise clearly the need to do so and 
the incentives of key actors across policy, industry and society are 
aligned. The climate crisis, like the Covid-19 crisis, involves tackling 
market failures, fostering international cooperation, marshalling com-
plex science, and asking questions of system resilience. And it requires 
political leadership, and whole sets of actions that hinge on public 
support (Hepburn et al., 2020). The potential global impacts of the 
climate crisis are slower to materialise, but much graver than those from 
Covid-19. And the actions to be taken are no less urgent. 
A sustainable recovery requires large-scale investment by the private 
and public sectors. And there are reasons to be hopeful that the required 
actions can be taken and sustained. Compared with the 2008 financial 
crisis, there appears to be more political support for a commitment both 
to grow out of the crisis and related debt and to “build back better” 
(Stern et al., 2020). After the 2008 crisis there was a retreat into austerity 
before growth had been re-established, which was a key factor in the 
weak growth of the past decade.4 And there was only a modest 
commitment to sustainability or a green response even though at the 
time of the 2008 financial crisis, analysis demonstrated the superior 
employment opportunities from clean energy infrastructure relative to 
fossil fuel investments, estimating that they would create twice as many 
jobs per dollar spent (Pollin et al., 2008). Over time, the case for in-
vestment in clean energy infrastructure has been further strengthened, 
and there is evidence that such investments can generate job opportu-
nities in the short and longer run (Unsworth et al., 2020b). We are 
already seeing evidence of increasing returns to scale in the discovery 
and production of clean technologies (Ekins and Zenghelis, 2021), for 
example via the dramatic declines observed in the costs of renewable 
energy, battery storage and electric vehicles. Indeed, solar and wind are 
the cheapest forms of new power generation in countries representing 
over 70 per cent of global GDP.5 
Sound, stable and credible public policy, sustained and long-term 
public investment, and a commitment to growth, play central roles in 
guiding and fostering private sector investment. The theoretical and 
empirical evidence we summarise here in relation to innovation and 
investment implies that a series of market failures will have to be 
tackled, requiring a suite of different policy instruments across carbon 
pricing, support for clean R&D, regulation and design, if the necessary 
investment and innovation for strong and sustainable growth is to be 
realised. The collection of instruments should be mutually reinforcing 
and supported by strong and long-term institutions, if the shift to sus-
tainable innovation and economic systems is to occur at the pace and 
scale necessary to drive growth and stabilise climate. It is now necessary 
to examine a question which, all too often, economics fails to tackle. 
Beyond analysing whether or not a set of policies can yield improve-
ments, we must ask whether they can deliver sufficiently rapidly. Time 
matters; delay is dangerous (Stern, 2018). 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 sets out approaches for 
understanding and modelling innovation and growth in the presence of 
multiple market failures, with a focus on path dependencies in innova-
tion systems, and draws out the implications for policy. Section 2 focuses 
on the empirics with respect to the drivers of sustainable innovation and 
investments, and the implications for growth and distribution. Section 3 
2 In 1987 the United Nations Brundtland Commission defined sustainability 
as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising on the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs”.  
3 For example, Deloitte and TechUK (2020) estimate that digital technologies 
already being deployed can deliver 15% of the UK’s required reduction in 
emissions by 2030. 
4 See, for example, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) who highlight how stronger 
fiscal consolidation was associated with lower growth, particularly in the early 
years post financial crisis.  
5 See, for example, SYSTEMIQ (2020). 
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considers political economy dimensions of the transition to a net-zero 
growth model. Section 4 provides some concluding comments. 
Path dependence and clean innovation 
Our starting point is the assertion that increasing “clean” innovation 
(defined broadly as that which directly or indirectly enables the net-zero 
transition) is necessary to enable the transformation required to tackle 
climate change, and we set out key findings from the theoretical liter-
ature6 that can inform understanding of the conditions necessary for this 
to be the chosen strategy of profit maximising firms. 
There is a strong rationale for policy that seeks to increase the amount 
of innovation in the economy. The market failures that are often tar-
geted by government support for research and development (R&D) and 
innovation activities are well documented (see, for example, Bloom 
et al., 2019). The central failure is associated with the existence of 
knowledge spillovers.7 Even in the presence of an effective system of 
intellectual property rights, an innovator is unlikely to be able to capture 
all the financial returns from associated R&D investments, with the 
implication that investments in R&D tend to be lower than the level that 
would be “socially optimal”. Further market failures arise due to im-
perfections in capital markets that may limit investment in “risky” 
projects, and from information or coordination frictions that can also 
hold back investment in innovation. 
There are also robust economic arguments for policies, investments 
and incentives that influence the direction of innovation towards tech-
nologies that can tackle the climate challenge. First, the evidence sug-
gests that knowledge spillovers appear to be particularly strong for clean 
technologies. Empirical analyses have found that the spillovers in clean 
technologies (as measured using forward citations in patents related to 
energy production and transport) tend to be higher than those generated 
by their dirty counterparts (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2014). Such analyses 
imply that the general decline in clean energy patenting that was seen in 
the early 2010s (Popp et al., 2020), which has started to reverse more 
recently (EPO and IEA, 2021), is of key concern from both a climate and 
growth perspective and that it is important for policymakers to look 
closely at the pace of innovation and R&D in these areas. Furthermore, 
over recent years and in the absence of strong policy signals and in-
centives, investments in early-stage clean technologies appear to have 
been viewed by many investors as more risky than the dirty alternatives 
that occupy established positions (see, for example, Nanda et al., 2015; 
Gaddy et al., 2017), implying heightened financing constraints.8 Indeed, 
Popp et al. (2020) document a spike in clean energy start-ups and 
funding around 2008 in the United States, and a decline thereafter.9 
Finally, further market failures apply in the context of greenhouse 
gas emissions. First, there is the negative externality that arises due to 
the damage that emissions inflict on others. In the absence of a robust 
carbon price, markets do not internalise the price of carbon emissions, 
and this reduces the incentives to invest in clean alternatives. Further, 
markets do not fully capture the societal co-benefits associated with 
decarbonisation via cleaner air, improved natural capital and related 
health benefits which in turn have positive economic impacts via, for 
example, a healthier and more productive workforce. Around the world 
air pollution contributes to many millions of deaths per year (World 
Health Organisation, 2020) with much of that pollution coming from the 
burning of fossil fuels. But even if the prices were right, strong inertia 
and path dependence in innovation systems make it difficult to shift 
from dirty to clean technologies quickly, without a strong and coordi-
nated enabling package of policies. 
Path dependence and directed technical change 
“Path dependence” arises when initial conditions and history matter 
for eventual outcomes. There are a number of sources of path depen-
dence in innovation processes (Aghion et al., 2014) and these can be 
amplified and reinforced by increasing returns to scale. First there is 
path dependence in the production of research and knowledge – many 
scientists prefer to work in areas that are well-funded and where other 
good scientists are working, allowing them to generate, build upon and 
benefit from the knowledge spillovers we discussed previously. Second, 
there is path dependence in the deployment of innovation, as the in-
centives to deploy products or technologies that use existing infra-
structure are higher than for those where the infrastructure is not yet 
rolled out at scale. Third, path dependence arises in the diffusion of new 
technologies, due to network effects and high switching costs. Network 
effects in technology adoption can create path dependence, where the 
benefits of using a particular technology rise with the number of others 
using the same technology, and infrastructure assets are often locked in 
due to the high costs of switching to alternative systems. 
Concepts of path dependence are captured in the literature on 
directed technical change, as applied to climate change, which stems 
from Acemoglu et al. (2012). In this paper, the authors analyse endog-
enous and directed technical change in a growth model with environ-
mental constraints and limited resources. In a model they develop, 
where the final good is produced from “dirty” and “clean” inputs, market 
forces naturally favour investments in dirty innovation (which might 
include technologies that improve fossil fuel efficiency). The network 
infrastructure and skills base are initially located in the dirty sector, and 
therefore, the immediate returns to innovating there are higher. A key 
implication is that clean technologies may never overtake dirty tech-
nologies without government intervention, which can shift the economy 
onto a clean equilibrium path. This is a problem beyond simply the 
greenhouse gas externality and, in order to avoid the excessive use of 
carbon taxes, optimal policy consists of both carbon taxes and research 
subsidies that support clean innovation. Another implication is that 
while there will be costs of adjustment during the transition, once the 
clean technology has gained sufficient productivity advantage and is 
able to benefit from its own patterns of path dependence, innovation 
policy incentives are no longer required. Innovation should be acceler-
ated by policy, given the system inertia, because delay is costly; it would 
necessitate a longer transition phase with slower growth. 
Aghion et al. (2016) take this type of model to the data in the case of 
the car industry, finding that firms tend to shift innovation from dirty 
(internal combustion engine) to clean (electric) when they face higher 
tax-inclusive fuel prices, and find that there is indeed path dependence 
in innovation type – based on both the aggregate spillovers to which 
firms are exposed, and firms’ own innovation histories. These findings 
imply that a carbon tax not only helps mitigate climate change directly, 
through reducing carbon consumption, but also indirectly by 
re-orienting R&D investments towards clean technologies and away 
from dirty ones. Numerical simulations give policymakers quantitative 
6 Our focus is on the literature on directed technological change, as first 
applied to climate change by Acemoglu et al. (2012). Traditional Integrated 
Assessment Models (e.g. Nordhaus, 2018) are not focused on the processes of 
innovation and transformation (Aghion et al., 2014), or representing path 
dependence (Grubb et al., 2021b)  
7 Spillovers or externalities arise from the fact that technological knowledge 
is a public good (Arrow, 1962). Spillovers occur when recipient firms exploit 
knowledge that was originally developed by another firm (Griliches, 1992). The 
recipient firm either copies or learns from the original research, without 
incurring the full R&D costs.  
8 See also recent analysis by Beauhurst, a UK start-up and scale-up data 
platform, which suggests that the clean-tech sector is amongst one of the 
riskiest in the UK for venture capitalists and private equity firms (Beauhurst, 
2019).  
9 The authors note that the decline in funding is less pronounced when 
considering clean energy firms that also claim to be “high-tech” firms. And they 
emphasise that studying firms or patents that are only identified as being in the 
energy sector is likely to underestimate the innovation and start-up activity that 
is relevant for decarbonisation. They highlight innovation in “high-tech” sectors 
that is also applicable in a number of areas relevant in the transition to net zero. 
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guidance on how quickly this can be achieved, finding that carbon taxes 
would have to increase very substantially given response elasticities. 
This analysis suggests that other policies such as R&D subsidies and 
regulation are also needed in order to meet the challenge at the pace and 
scale necessary. 
Van der Meijden and Smulders (2017) emphasise the role of expec-
tations about future energy use in a model of directed technical change. 
This analysis is complementary to the Acemoglu et al. (2012) model, but 
it emphasises lock-in that arises due to expectations rather than initial 
conditions. In this model, the anticipation of a transition to renewables 
reduces the incentives to invest in fossil technology, resulting in an 
equilibrium with renewables and low fossil efficiency. But an alternative 
equilibrium without renewables, but with high fossil use, albeit with 
greater efficiency, is also possible. Over and above the need for policy to 
address market failures and path dependencies, this paper highlights the 
important role of policy for guiding investor expectations towards the 
clean equilibrium (eventually without fossil fuels). 
In summary, these key papers suggest that carbon pricing is neces-
sary, but not sufficient to shift to a path of clean innovation that benefits 
from its own path dependencies. Further support for clean innovation, 
that accelerates diffusion via investments in the appropriate clean 
infrastructure assets, and effective regulation are required if a zero- 
carbon transition is to be achieved. And these must be brought 
together into a credible and coordinated package of policies and in-
stitutions that can guide expectations. This literature also highlights the 
importance of acting quickly and at scale. Delaying action means locking 
into dirty technologies and infrastructure thereby both prolonging 
emissions and making it more costly to change later. 
The international dimension 
The economic growth opportunities stemming from clean innovation 
must also be considered in an international context. Where countries 
have comparative advantage in particular areas of clean innovation that 
can be deployed in other markets, this can generate opportunities for 
growth domestically, while going further with respect to reducing 
emissions globally. Such issues have been considered with respect to the 
diffusion of clean innovations from more technologically advanced 
economies into emerging economies. While some emerging markets, 
such as China or Brazil, play a key role at the global innovation frontier, 
many are more likely to adopt or imitate clean technologies previously 
invented elsewhere. 
Consideration of the international context implies that policies that 
promote clean innovation in high-income countries may not lead to 
socially optimal emission reduction unless there are additional in-
terventions that support the transfer and deployment of clean technol-
ogies elsewhere. Hémous (2016) builds on the Acemoglu et al. (2012) 
framework to analyse a multi-country model: “North” with policy and 
“South” with laissez-faire. A unilateral carbon tax in the North leads to a 
dynamic pollution haven effect in the South. The model implies that 
policy interventions that price carbon and subsidise clean R&D in more 
innovation-intense economies (North), should be accompanied by pol-
icies that facilitate technology transfer and build absorptive capacity in 
the South. In the context of trade, over and above making clean tech-
nologies available and affordable in the South, carbon tariffs (or the 
threat of introducing them) may be required to prevent the South spe-
cialising in dirty goods (Aghion and Jaravel, 2015). 
Intermediate technologies 
While there is general agreement as to the need to accelerate the 
invention and diffusion of “clean” technologies, views differ with respect 
to the role of intermediate or bridge technologies that relate to reducing 
or removing carbon emissions from “dirty” processes. In the context of 
the directed technical change literature, Acemoglu et al. (2019) extends 
Acemoglu et al. (2012) to include intermediate (“bridge”) technologies. 
The model is calibrated to the US electricity sector to estimate the static 
and dynamic effects of a shale gas boom, and a key finding is that bridge 
technologies can “backfire” if they reduce clean innovation. Aghion et al. 
(2014) explain how the logic of path dependence due to reliance on 
intermediate technologies applies to gas - where there is also the risk of 
lock-in due to gas-based infrastructure (thus they do not turn out to be a 
bridge to clean technologies). Such intermediate technologies may 
warrant support as long as it is time-limited, and that it does not come at 
the expense of increased support for fully clean alternatives. In the case 
of carbon capture utilisation and storage, including air capture, while 
increased R&D in such areas could reduce, in principle, the incentive to 
urgently push for renewables, such strategies build in flexibility to 
meeting decarbonisation targets, and are likely to be important for 
certain sectors at certain times – such as steel or cement. 
Customer values and product market competition 
Other key forces shape the direction of firm innovation. Firms are 
more likely to invest in innovation in areas where demand is large and 
growing – and may therefore consider consumer preferences more 
carefully. Product market competition also shapes firm innovation, and 
while the impact is theoretically ambiguous (Bloom et al., 2019), the 
empirical evidence generally suggests that competition increases inno-
vation, particularly in markets with initially low levels of competition. 
Aghion et al. (2021) develop a theoretical model that allows customer 
environmental values and product market competition to shape firm 
R&D. The authors show (theoretically and empirically) that there is a 
complementarity between product market competition and 
pro-environmental attitudes of consumers. Thus, firms will invest in 
cleaner innovation when facing more environmentally-motivated cus-
tomers. This effect is stronger the harder they must compete for their 
customers. These findings suggest that, from a policy perspective, public 
campaigns to promote citizens’ environmental responsibility are likely 
to be an important policy lever for stimulating clean innovation, espe-
cially when combined with more competitive markets. Many firms, such 
as Unilever,10 also point to their ability to attract more talented workers 
if they demonstrate commitment to environmentally (and socially) 
responsible policies. Further perspectives on the political economy 
dimension of directed technical change (Besley and Persson, 2020) are 
discussed in Section 3. 
Alternative approaches for modelling complex economic systems 
The literature on endogenous and directed technical change iden-
tifies and models key forces driving clean innovation in particular sec-
tors, and highlights the importance of complementarities. However, 
achieving net zero will require rapid and radical structural change 
across the economy. Thus it is important to consider how the findings 
from such models can be integrated to provide insights and recom-
mendations for economy-wide policy frameworks in the context of un-
certainty. Moreover, there are limitations in the ability of traditional 
models to fully capture path-dependencies and reinforcing feedbacks 
that can lead to multiple equilibria, and therefore limitations in the 
ability of the traditional models to predict the costs and benefits of the 
transition over the next few decades. 
One alternative approach suggests that dynamic models of the 
economy should be accompanied by models of opinion dynamics and 
behaviour via the use of agent-based models. Such models explicitly 
reflect interactions between heterogeneous, networked individuals in 
place of conventional utility-maximising “representative agents” 
(Farmer and Foley, 2009). They can therefore offer insights into the 
processes and associated probability with which economies shift from 
one equilibrium to another (Mealy and Hepburn 2019, Farmer, et al., 
10 See Unilever (2020). 
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2015), in particular via “tipping points” which might be triggered by 
particular policies or a breakthrough technology, for example cheap and 
efficient energy storage.11 While there are a number of drawbacks 
associated with such models, including the lack of commonly accepted 
standards and validation procedures (Mealy and Hepburn, 2017), they 
can help illuminate possible relevant outcomes and processes of change 
which might be excluded by the assumptions of standard equilibrium 
modelling. 
Mercure et al. (2020) note that at times of long-run, non-marginal 
change, the primary concern is not how efficiently resources are allo-
cated (in the context of static optimisation), but how effectively eco-
nomic structures can be repurposed and steered. This implies a focus on 
expected processes that drive change over time, rather than attempting 
to model expected outcomes at particular moments in time. They set out 
a “risk-opportunity assessment” framework to inform policy where 
transformational change is required in the face of largescale uncertainty, 
path dependencies, non-linearities and heterogeneity of stakeholders, as 
is the case with respect to climate change mitigation and low-carbon 
innovation. The emphasis is on building understanding on the likely 
direction, rate, and magnitude of change under different policy sce-
narios, such that decisions can be based on a qualitative judgement of 
the scale of the opportunities and risks, compared to the cost of the 
intervention. 
Broad lessons from theory 
Conclusions for action: The theoretical evidence suggests that action 
at scale and across the economy, via a coordinated set of policies and 
institutions, is required in order to tackle the multiple market failures 
that coexist, and shift the trajectory of economies so that path depen-
dence favours clean innovation and investment. Given the devastating 
environmental and substantial economic costs of locking-in to dirty as-
sets and infrastructure, time scales and rates of change must be at the 
centre stage of policy assessments. Policy-orientated analytical work 
here should not be dominated by simple comparisons of equilibria. 
Conclusions for research: The market failures and path- 
dependencies outlined raise questions concerning the right economy- 
wide frameworks for aligning incentives and expectations with the 
transition to net zero. Tractable and quantifiable models are needed, 
that can go beyond traditional growth models and capture the key in-
gredients of sustainability, inclusion and growth and the challenges 
associated with rapid change over the next two decades. A collection of 
models is likely to be required, each of which could capture different 
elements of the complex challenges, drawing upon insights from 
different disciplines. Within such models, and on how we combine in-
sights from different models, more work is needed to understand com-
plementarities between different features of the innovation system, and 
between different types of innovation too (e.g. improving batteries will 
lead to more innovation in solar/wind). Such models must be informed 
by careful empirical and forward-looking analyses, which is the topic of 
the next section. 
Clean growth: Opportunities, drivers and policies 
Achieving large-scale change quickly will require an understanding 
of the opportunities and displacements in the next wave of technological 
change, as the rise of automation (viewed by many to have accelerated 
due to the Covid-19 crisis12) intertwines with the zero-carbon transition. 
This must build upon lessons from previous waves of technological 
change and contemporary evidence on the impacts of policies for (clean) 
innovation and investment. This in turn requires timely metrics on the 
quantity of innovation, and its type; and robust evaluation to shed light 
on the relative effectiveness of different policy levers and their in-
teractions at the international, national and local levels. 
Measurement of clean innovation and future growth opportunities 
The zero-carbon transition offers substantial economy-wide oppor-
tunities for growth (Rydge et al., 2018; Stern et al., 2020). Understanding 
these opportunities requires looking beyond supporting a narrowly 
defined “low-carbon sector”.13 Future growth must be sustainable 
growth and that means building a net-zero-carbon economy that is 
resilient to the changes and shocks that are likely to characterise the 21st 
century. Given that it is total world emissions that have to go to net zero, 
the transformation will involve all economic sectors and regions. These 
changes have the potential to empower local communities and improve 
living standards across society. They will both require and foster 
entrepreneurship. 
The economic disruption caused by the pandemic, and the large- 
scale government interventions that have resulted from it, give rise to 
an opportunity for a green recovery. Net-zero-aligned investments can 
generate jobs quickly (see Unsworth et al., 2020b, for discussion in the 
UK context). They can be both labour-intensive and fast in imple-
mentation (examples include retrofitting buildings, intensifying broad-
band, restoring degraded land). Further, technical advances are creating 
opportunities for improvements to labour and resource productivity, 
through complementary investments in innovation (invention and 
diffusion), infrastructure and human capital across the economy. 
With global demand for cleaner and more environmentally friendly 
products and technologies set to increase rapidly in the coming decades, 
countries that take early action to develop clean technologies, products 
and processes may be able to go to scale quicker, establish markets and 
thus reap significant growth benefits. Government recovery packages 
and industrial policies in response to Covid-19 are likely to play a key 
role in shaping which economies are better positioned in this “green 
race” (Fankhauser et al., 2013). Evidence from the 2008 financial crisis 
has shown how recovery packages can support future industries (Mun-
daca and Richter, 2015). 
A key question for policymakers is how to best target investments 
and design policies to promote the development of a given country’s 
current and potential future competitive strengths, and to avoid the 
pitfalls of attempting to “pick winners”. The challenge is to set policies 
such as carbon pricing and effective regulation (e.g. dates to phase out 
the sale of vehicles with an internal combustion engine) which point 
firmly away from fossil fuels but do not prescribe particular ways of 
doing things. At the same time some paths are already clear in the sense 
that we must expand electricity supply very quickly and make it zero 
carbon. 
Here we set out three examples of forward-looking and data-driven 
approaches that can help countries or regions to identify opportunities 
for sustainable innovation and growth. 
11 See also Farmer et al., (2019) for discussion on “sensitive intervention 
tipping points” (SIPs), which the authors argue can involve a kick to the status 
quo (e.g. subsidising renewable energy sources to lower their costs), or a “shift” 
in underlying system dynamics (e.g. a shift in the institutional regime). In 
practice SIPs are likely to consist of a mixture of the two. This paper sets out 
four SIPs that could contribute to decarbonisation: financial disclosure, targeted 
technology investments, political mobilisation and the UK Climate Change Act. 
12 See, for example, Autor and Reynolds (2020).  
13 In the UK, the ONS Low Carbon and Renewable Energy Economy (LCREE) 
Survey estimates that the LCREE accounted for around 1% of total UK non- 
financial turnover and employment in 2018. 
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Analyses of patents and spillovers 
A body of empirical work has analysed clean innovation using pat-
ents data which provides an indication of the output of innovative ac-
tivity.14 While not all innovations are patented,15 the advantages of this 
approach include the fact that patents data are available across coun-
tries, over time, and technologies can easily be classified as being 
“clean”.16 Patents contain detailed information about the invention in 
question17 and citations to other patents, which allows the calculation of 
“spillover” measures (e.g. future patents that cite an original patent, or 
cite patents that cite an original patent). A key finding from analyses of 
clean versus dirty patents has been that knowledge spillovers (as 
measured via global patent citations) for clean innovations are over 40 
per cent greater than their high-carbon counterparts in the energy 
production and transport sectors (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2014). This 
finding suggests that there is an enhanced case for public support or 
incentives for innovation in clean technologies, even from a pure 
“market failure” perspective. 
Such analyses have been extended in order to help inform clean in-
dustrial or innovation policy. While measures of spillovers, as reflected 
in chains of forward citations, are informative about the relevance of a 
particular patent for future patents, they do not provide information 
about the economic value generated by that patent. Accordingly, mea-
sures of spillovers have been refined to reflect the returns to public R&D 
investments in particular technologies18 (Guillard et al., 2020). 
This methodology, combined with measures of comparative advan-
tage in innovation (“revealed technological advantage”),19 has been 
applied in the UK context in forward-looking analyses that seek to shed 
light on where opportunities for sustainable growth and recovery might 
lie.20 Martin et al., (2020) provide a recent analysis in the context of a 
sustainable recovery from the pandemic. This paper compares broad 
categories of technologies, but draws out results for clean technologies 
and the types of technology that are relevant for tackling and adapting to 
Covid-19 (e.g. vaccine development). The authors find that the UK is 
relatively specialised in ocean and wind energy, as well as Covid-related 
technologies, and biotechnology and pharmaceuticals more broadly, 
and that potential UK returns to public investments in these clean and 
Covid-related technologies are also high. Together, this evidence sug-
gests that the UK innovation system is well-placed to tackle major so-
cietal challenges, and that it can also benefit economically from support 
to the areas identified. A further benefit accrues to clean innovation. 
Areas that specialise in clean innovations are relatively widely spread 
around the country, suggesting that support for such technologies could 
also play a key role in narrowing regional disparities and achieving 
growth that is more inclusive across the country (the “levelling-up” 
agenda).21 
It is important to note that the economic returns calculated here do 
not include the value of other major, but hard to quantify, externalities 
associated with promoting some particular technological fields over 
others. For instance, the methodology does not capture the widespread 
benefits of reducing global warming. Nevertheless, this analysis can help 
to inform a clean industrial or innovation policy that could result in a 
“win-win” scenario of benefitting future growth as well as addressing 
societal challenges. 
Analysis of product complexity and relatedness 
Another approach for identifying growth opportunities uses data on 
traded goods. A standard way to measure areas of relative strength is to 
consider “revealed comparative advantage” in trade, for example, if a 
country exports a higher share of solar panels than the global average, 
we may conclude that this country has some degree of competitiveness 
in this product. However, products will differ in terms of their potential 
to generate future growth in a country. One way to capture such dif-
ferences is via the Product Complexity Index (PCI) (Hidalgo and Haus-
mann, 2009). More “complex” products tend to be more technologically 
sophisticated and offer greater knowledge spillovers into other products. 
Mealy and Teytelboym (2020) apply these metrics to a data set of traded 
“green” products and show that these tend to have higher complexity 
than average. 
Building on this work, Unsworth et al., (2020b) consider a set of 
“net-zero-aligned” products, and combine product complexity and a 
measure of “difficulty transitioning” (this indicates how difficult it 
would be for a country to transition into a new product, given its 
relatedness to the products in which the country is currently competi-
tive) to highlight where clean growth opportunities might lie in the UK 
and other core comparator countries. The analysis finds that there are a 
number of technologically sophisticated green products that are rela-
tively close to the UK’s existing capabilities and where the UK has 
comparative advantage internationally (mainly relating to power gen-
eration, carbon capture utilisation and storage, and hydrogen). The 
picture for France and US overall is similar to the UK, though in the 
categories where these countries do not yet have comparative advan-
tage, the difficulty transitioning tends to be a bit lower than for the UK. 
In contrast, Germany is already competitive in the majority of 
net-zero-aligned products, and those in which it is not yet competitive 
tend to be closer to existing capabilities than in the UK. 
Analysis of firm activities 
Developing a better real-time understanding of clean innovation 
requires new, broader measures or indicators of innovation (to include 
products or processes that are not patented or identified in trade data), 
taking account of the evolution of technological systems and empha-
sising the interconnectedness of different types of technology and 
different parts of the innovation system.22 
Advances in data and analytics have opened up new possibilities for 
understanding economic activity via the analysis of text in company 
websites, communications, hiring activities, fundraising announcements 
or other news. Such “web-intelligence” data can be particularly useful in 
understanding emerging sectors where the existing industrial classifi-
cation system offers insufficient granularity (in the UK, the Standard 
14 Patents also provide a good indicator of R&D activity (Popp, 2019), as 
patent applications are usually filed early in the research process (Griliches, 
1990).  
15 For example, broadly speaking, innovations in the service sector are less 
likely to be patented than in manufacturing; and innovations that relate to new 
processes within firms tend not to be patented.  
16 The European Patent Office “Y” scheme provides separate classifications for 
technologies relevant for climate change mitigation and adaption.  
17 Such text can be further analysed for more granular information analyses 
within technology classes using machine learning (see, for example Dugoua 
(2020) on CFC innovation).  
18 The calculations account for direct and indirect knowledge spillovers 
occurring within the UK, variations in private R&D returns, variation in R&D 
costs and differences in the responsiveness to subsidies between different 
technology areas.  
19 RTA compares an economy’s patents in a particular technology field to the 
global share of patents in that field. A country with an RTA greater than one for 
a particular technology, is relatively specialised in that area. This is a similar 
concept to the more standard “Revealed Comparative Advantage” in trade.  
20 Rydge et al. (2018) provide an initial economy-wide analysis and Unsworth 
et al. (2020a) focuses on zero-carbon passenger vehicles. 
21 Examples include electric vehicle production in the West Midlands, wind 
turbines on the east coast and carbon capture in the North East of England and 
in Scotland.  
22 As suggested by Popp et al. (2020), traditional measures of energy patenting 
and innovation might not reflect the benefits that digital or other high-tech 
advances bring to the energy sector. 
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Industrial Classification System was last updated in 2007), and when 
seeking to capture the innovation activities of firms or agents that might 
not be patented or be straightforward to patent. Due to the rich infor-
mation available, analyses of such data can also be used to reveal link-
ages between firms and other parts of the innovation system, including 
universities and investors that are engaged in net zero, and to analyse 
the drivers of their success. Importantly, text analyses can help to reveal 
patterns in the application of emerging “general purpose technologies” 
(for example, AI, robotics and the Internet of Things) to climate change. 
The type of analysis that is needed, and is now in progress across the 
academic, policy and business community, involves creating new and 
evolving classifications of firms operating in technologies and sectors 
that are key to the transition. Recent years have seen such analyses of the 
digital economy (see, for example, Nathan and Rosso, 2015) and crea-
tive sectors (NESTA, 2018). Given the urgent nature of the climate crisis, 
and the need to have robust data to inform policy, it will be important to 
build definitions, mappings and measurement methods, including 
agreement on how these should be updated over time, that are sound, 
practical and widely shared. 
Evidence-based policies for clean innovation and growth 
Understanding the ultimate causes and paths of innovation trends 
and accelerations, and how policy can influence these, is challenging, 
and many inter-related factors have been suggested and analysed in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. A multitude of studies provide ev-
idence that climate change regulations, either directly or through their 
impact on energy prices, encourage the diffusion of environmentally- 
friendly technologies and drive innovation activity further up the 
technology supply chain, favouring R&D in low-carbon technologies 
(Dechezleprêtre et al., 2019).23 Moreover, where the mechanism is 
through prices, the evidence suggests that much of the innovative 
response occurs quickly. For example, Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) 
show that the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has 
rapidly increased patenting in “clean” technologies amongst partici-
pating companies. 
In terms of the types of environmental policies that are required to 
reduce emissions, the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (2017) con-
cludes that the evidence (drawn from theoretical, and empirical litera-
tures and policy experience to date) implies that “Carbon pricing by 
itself may not be sufficient to induce change at the pace and on the scale 
required for the Paris target to be met” (p3). The types of policies that 
must accompany it will vary by context, across and within countries, but 
will include investment in infrastructure, R&D, natural capital, regula-
tion and standards including for energy efficiency, urban planning and 
design and developing ways to lower the cost of capital in zero-carbon 
technologies and projects. 
More broadly, in order to realise the investment that can both deliver 
the economic benefits from the transition to net zero and foster a strong 
and sustainable recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, environmental pol-
icies must fit and be embedded within coherent, coordinated and 
committed growth strategies that invest in people and productive assets 
(Stern et al., 2020). Given the international nature of the climate crisis, 
the interconnectedness of economies, and the importance of expecta-
tions and scale, coherence, coordination, and commitment across na-
tions is vital (Stern, 2021). More discussion of these areas, in the context 
of a sustainable recovery from Covid-19 follows. 
Carbon pricing 
As recovery turns into growth, finance ministries should consider 
where it is possible to both create positive incentives to decarbonise and 
raise revenues at a time of fiscal pressure. Periods of low oil prices 
present an opportunity to introduce a robust carbon price and build 
incentives to shift to cleaner sources of energy (Burke et al., 2020). In the 
UK context, analysis suggests that a politically feasible carbon price 
could start at around £40 per tCO2 and rise to £125 per tCO2, or more, in 
2050 (Burke et al., 2019).24 Both learning and the pace of change are 
central to the transformation to net-zero. In this context, and with other 
market failures, it may make sense to depart from a uniform price and 
give stronger signals in areas where innovation at the necessary pace is 
more difficult (or provide other sector-specific incentives). 
The net-zero transition can and should be steered by a strong and 
rising carbon price. Protection of living standards of poorer groups will 
be a key issue; part of the carbon revenue should be used for this pur-
pose. Care should also be taken with the liquidity of firms, taking into 
account possible fragility during the period of recovery from the Covid- 
19 crisis (Martin and Van Reenen, 2020). 
Regulation, standards and design 
Effectively designed regulations and standards (alongside economic 
incentives including taxes) can guide innovation successfully in clean 
directions. The phase-out of incandescent lightbulbs and the emergence 
of LED provides a case study, and there are a number of causal analyses 
of the impacts of more stringent standards (see, for example, Noailly 
(2012), which finds that changes in the stringency of European building 
codes induced innovations in energy efficiency). Ensuring that regula-
tion in key decarbonisation areas is growing more ambitious through the 
current crisis – as opposed to becoming side-lined or loosened - could 
help to protect against possible downward movements in oil prices 
delaying the speed of the transition. For example, governments can 
accelerate the phase-out of petrol, diesel and hybrid vehicles by setting 
dates beyond which no vehicles with internal combustion engines can be 
sold; accompanying such regulatory change with supportive policies to 
enable the diffusion of zero-carbon vehicles, including demand-side 
incentives and accelerating the roll-out of charging infrastructure. 
Standards are also important for helping to move national and in-
ternational systems (e.g. in the design of energy, transport or cities) onto 
structures and paths which can drive and support sustainable growth. 
Where standards are shared, then interactions across technologies and 
systems are enabled, creating larger markets and thus higher social and 
private returns for innovations. 
Many regulatory authorities (for example, around telecoms, energy, 
water) were set in place following or accompanying privatisation in the 
1980s and 1990s. They have largely been focused on prices facing 
consumers. Now the protection of society requires a first-order addi-
tional focus on sustainability and the transition to zero carbon. And 
regulators should take a “whole economy” view on how their own ac-
tions interrelate with those of other regulators and planning authorities. 
For example, regulation for new transmission and storage investments to 
provide for more renewable electricity will need to be coherent with 
those associated with local planning permissions. 
Innovation policy 
We have set out the strong rationale for government support and 
incentives for innovation, both in terms of invention and its diffusion, in 
23 For extensive reviews of research on environmental policy and innovation 
across a range of policy instruments and countries, see Popp (2019) and Popp 
et al. (2010). Grubb et al., (2021a) conduct a systematic review of the literature 
(across disciplines) that has analysed the impact of energy or carbon prices on 
innovation, and the impact on demand-pull policies (incentives and regulation). 
In general, the innovation outcome considered is patents. Grubb et al. (2021a) 
also analyse the engineering-based “experience curve” literature which links 
cost reduction to the cumulative deployment of clean technologies. 
24 Stern and Stiglitz (2021a, b) suggest a social cost of carbon/carbon price 
around $100 per tonne by 2030. 
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Section 1. Bloom et al. (2019) summarise the evidence on the relative 
effectiveness of different policy levers that have been used to increase 
innovation. The authors produce a toolkit for policymakers, assessing 
the strength of the evidence and key findings across nine categories of 
policy, some of which are explicitly invention-orientated (including 
R&D grants, tax credits and intellectual property rights) while others are 
broader (including the role of universities, skilled immigration, trade or 
missions). The authors conclude that, in the short-run, R&D tax credits 
and direct public funding appear to be the most effective tools for 
increasing innovation, while increasing the supply of human capital is 
more effective in the longer run. 
Much of the evidence base relates to evaluating marginal changes in 
various policies or incentives. But given the urgency and scale of tack-
ling climate change, the current economic crisis, and weak productivity 
that pre-dates it, there is a strong case for a step-change in the amount 
and direction of investment in innovation, and in a dynamic innovation 
policy that goes beyond fixing specific and static market failures to be 
“missions-driven” (Mazzucato, 2013), providing direction to the inno-
vation efforts of firms (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017). The impor-
tance of this type of approach was demonstrated during the Covid-19 
crisis with resources being directed towards R&D and diffusion across a 
range of sectors to fight the virus and enable economies to function. 
Advance market commitments and coordinated action across relevant 
actors and stakeholders played an important role. Resources must be 
similarly mobilised towards the climate crisis. 
It is clear that a broad view of innovation policy must be taken, 
considering the suite of policies and investments that are required to 
support innovation and its diffusion, and all aspects of national inno-
vation systems (Freeman, 1987). Edler and Fagerberg (2017) set out a 
broad taxonomy of innovation policy instruments that captures this, 
including cluster policies, training programmes, the role of public pro-
curement, standards and regulation. There are many areas where more 
research is needed to understand causal relationships, complementar-
ities between different policy levers, and how collaboration between 
actors (e.g. universities and industry) can be encouraged (OECD, 2019). 
But overall, the evidence suggests that effective support for clean 
innovation and its diffusion can take the form of grants and enhanced 
tax breaks for research, development, commercialisation and deploy-
ment, as well as subsidies, and can be coupled with effective regulation, 
obligations and other mechanisms (such as feed-in tariffs for clean en-
ergy generation). Positive innovation responses since the onset of the 
crisis – for example increased digital adoption (Riom and Valero, 2020), 
remote working, the associated fall in business travel – can be encour-
aged as the economy moves into recovery, where they increase labour 
and resource productivity, together with increased flexibility and job 
satisfaction. Given the economy-wide nature of the climate and eco-
nomic challenges faced, innovation should be at the heart of the remit of 
policymakers and stakeholders across the board (Edler and Fagerberg, 
2017). 
Long-term sustainable and inclusive growth policies and institutions 
In many nations, the extent of government support for industry due 
to Covid-19, and the scale of investment needed (in the public and 
private sectors) to meet net-zero commitments, together present an 
opportunity to develop a strong partnership between the public and 
private sectors with incentives aligned towards innovation-led sustain-
able and inclusive growth across the economy. Strong investment, and 
the associated innovation, requires confidence in the commitment of 
governments to sustained growth. Long-term and credible industrial 
policies for a sustainable recovery are necessary (at national and more 
local levels), to guide investor expectations and align incentives across 
the economy. And strong, long-term institutions will boost confidence 
and reduce the cost of capital, by sharing and reducing risk (Baker et al., 
2015). Development banks are particularly important, helping to reduce 
and manage crucial early stage and political risks, both through their 
presence and financing instruments – hence helping to mobilise private 
sector investment. The presence of a national development bank can 
help reduce risk and create confidence in both the sense of direction and 
the willingness to solve problems as they arrive. The European Invest-
ment Bank and the EBRD provide strong examples, as, is hoped, will the 
new UK national infrastructure bank. 
Human capital is a key input for achieving sustainable and inclusive 
growth, driving innovation and its diffusion, and improving labour 
market outcomes and resilience for individuals.25 Increased investment 
in human capital via the education system, and via training programmes 
will be required to help to realise new opportunities, manage dislocation 
and to avoid long-term labour market scarring for workers displaced by 
the pandemic. A number of net-zero-aligned investments are labour 
intensive and are expected to generate new jobs quickly (see Unsworth 
et al., 2020b for analysis based on the UK). But the transition will also 
have complex and multifaceted impacts upon labour markets, and these 
will interact with broader technological trends such as automation. It is 
therefore essential that skills and employment policies are at the heart of 
a clean recovery and just-transition for workers. 
Internationalism 
Climate change and the Covid-19 crisis are global emergencies 
requiring internationally coordinated responses. There is a vital neces-
sity for an internationally coordinated response to recovery efforts to 
ensure that they are based on sustainable investments, and to reduce 
risks of disruptions to domestic production. Sustained unemployment 
not only damages the productivity of the workforce but the associated 
economic hardships can also play into an erosion of social cohesion and 
populist discourses. 
There is clear need for stronger international institutions and 
multilateral action as the global economy seeks to recover from Covid- 
19. Institutions such as the IMF will be essential in servicing the finan-
cial needs of many countries in the rescue and recovery periods, and the 
IMF will need the resources and capabilities to meet this demand. In-
ternational institutions and multilateral development banks such as the 
World Bank will need to step up lending to regions around the world 
which are vulnerable to the virus and its economic repercussions. This 
should also include new instruments for rapid disbursements. 
The experience of Covid-19 can carry positive lessons. These include 
the recognition that we can change the way we live and work very 
rapidly if we see the imperative to do so. We have seen that strong 
response in severe crises require communities to pull together and, 
indeed, that global crises require nations to act together. Shocks and 
threats of the Covid-19 scale lead us to ask what kind of re-building we 
want to do and what sort of economies and societies we want to be. We 
have learned something about making the most efficient use of the re-
sources we have and making “necessity the mother of invention”. All 
these lessons can and must help us with the climate crisis. It is much 
bigger and longer lasting than Covid-19, but not yet quite as visible. 
Nevertheless, it is with us right now and delay in response is dangerous. 
This is a moment where a strong and coordinated international 
response has a quadruple win. First, if countries act together to increase 
investment demand, the Keynesian expansion benefits all, as opposed to 
one country seeing its demand expansion increase employment else-
where. Second, a strong commitment to sustained growth will improve 
expectations and lead to sustained investment. Third, a clear path to 
growth will lead to economies of scale which can drive down costs and 
foster innovation. Fourth, all of society stands to gain from emissions 
reductions, less pollution and strong biodiversity. 
25 For a summary of the literature that has linked education to economic 
growth at the country, region and firm level, see Valero (2021). 
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Broad lessons from the data and evidence 
Conclusions for action: Given the scale of the climate and economic 
challenges faced, policies for a strong and sustainable recovery must 
include environmental and growth levers. A robust carbon price must be 
complemented by a suite of mutually reinforcing policies, regulations 
and investments in infrastructure, human capital and innovation, all of 
which are coordinated as part of a stable and long-term sustainable re-
covery plan. 
Conclusions for research: While there is a body of research on the 
effectiveness of environmental and innovation policies on (clean) 
innovation, we need more causal evidence of the effectiveness of policies 
and how they interact with other policies or institutional features, 
domestically and internationally. In order to inform policy in real-time, 
detailed micro-analyses must be combined with top-down analyses; and 
new, complementary sources of data on innovation and clean growth 
opportunities (including using web-based data on firms’ activities) are 
needed to inform policy. 
Political economy and sustainable growth 
So far, the discussion has been focused mainly on “production”, or 
the supply-side drivers of technological change, and the role of policy in 
influencing both the amount and direction of innovation and invest-
ment. The “demand side” matters too. Changes in behaviours and 
preferences of consumers, workers, shareholders and voters are also key 
to driving change in business and policy decisions. And business de-
cisions can have a powerful influence on consumer behaviours; there is 
clear endogeneity here. Conversely, resistance or a lack of support from 
consumers, voters and businesses (particularly larger firms with strong 
lobbying power26) can be key barriers to change. This section begins 
with a discussion of recent papers that have brought the considerations 
of values and politics into models of directed technical change, before 
considering recent trends in values and what all this implies for building 
support and consensus for a “green industrial revolution”. 
Values, politics and directed technical change 
As summarised in Section 1, customer values have been built into 
models of directed technical change. Aghion et al. (2021) find theoret-
ical and empirical evidence that such values matter, particularly in more 
competitive markets, and that the magnitudes of the effects appear 
large. In fact, their analysis suggests that a combination of realistic in-
creases in pro-environmental attitudes and in product market competi-
tion can have the same effect on clean innovation as a 34% increase in 
fuel prices worldwide. 
Besley and Persson (2020) bring the political economy perspective to 
this type of analysis. They examine the interdependencies between 
environmental values, technological change and politics, combining a 
model of values and environmental taxation (Besley and Persson, 2019) 
with a model of directed technical change (consistent with Acemoglu 
et al., 2012). A key starting point is the observation that the trans-
formation required for a green industrial revolution entails a comple-
mentarity that drives a two-way dynamic between values and 
technologies. If clean technologies are more attractive, people are more 
likely to develop pro-environmental values and lifestyles. And if more 
people change their lifestyle, firms are more likely to develop clean 
technologies. Consideration of the role of policy in this context, they 
argue, must explicitly include politics and account for current political 
objectives; and the inability of incumbents to commit their successors to 
future policies. 
A key finding is that changing values can support a shift towards an 
equilibrium of predominantly clean technologies. However, the com-
plementarities between technology and values, mediated by politics, 
imply that society may or may not cross a tipping point which enables 
the shift to a clean trajectory. This framework also implies that politics 
can be influenced by forces or actions which empower those with pro- 
environmental attitudes, or increase the weight on their views in policy. 
Citizens’ views, behaviour change and voting 
These analyses suggest that understanding the political and behav-
ioural influences, constraints and opportunities shaping the net-zero 
transition, and how these may have changed in light of the Covid-19 
crisis, will be key to policies and actions to achieve a strong and sus-
tainable recovery. 
The “finite pool of worry” hypothesis (Weber, 1997) states that 
environmental and climate concerns diminish as other worries gain in 
prominence. Under this hypothesis we would expect that the health and 
economic concerns associated with the Covid-19 pandemic would have 
reduced public perceptions of climate change severity or reality. In fact, 
surveys based on the UK (Evensen et al., 2021) and US (Leiserowitz et al., 
2020) since the onset of the pandemic find little evidence of this, and 
suggest that this could be explained by climate change becoming more 
of a permanent concern in recent years. 
But even where attitudes are pro-environmental, a number of bar-
riers and frictions might prevent sustainable consumption patterns 
(Padilla, 2018). Clearly a key friction is price, where in many areas 
sustainable options are more expensive, perhaps seen as luxury items. 
For many, certain goods are unaffordable. And for others, just as is the 
case with countries,27 there can be a problem of “free-riding”, where 
there is a reluctance at the individual level to bear the higher costs of 
low-carbon goods and services, despite a desire to benefit from the 
public good of a clean economy. 
As we have discussed, innovation and economies of scale are key 
determinants of prices, and investment, regulation and demand-side 
incentives can both accelerate these and change patterns of consump-
tion quickly. These changes in costs and prices have become very 
powerful and on a recent estimate, clean solutions could be competitive 
(without a carbon price or a subsidy) by 2030 in sectors accounting for 
nearly three-quarters of emissions (see SYSTEMIQ, 2020). But there are 
other barriers to clean consumption. In many areas, the ability of an 
individual to choose the “clean” option depends on complementary 
infrastructure or systems being in place, e.g. charging infrastructure in 
relation to electric vehicles. Some of these barriers might be more severe 
for poorer people without government action. In other areas, inadequate 
information on production processes and supply chains can prevent 
consumers understanding differences between products. There is an 
important role for policy in addressing these types of friction, via 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting requirements to 
guide socially-conscious financial investments, and improved product 
labelling to enable robust comparison for consumers. 
Ultimately decisions are made by elected politicians. Even in an 
environment of high and increasing concern for the environment, public 
buy-in is required for governments to pursue programmes of economic 
transformation at the scale and speed required and in the context of the 
unprecedented economic shock caused by Covid-19. This involves 
realising and better communicating the economic and wider benefits 
involved, clear strategies for managing the transition for those displaced 
or bearing costs, and public discussion of the issues. Indeed, the notion 
26 For example, Brulle (2018) conducts an analysis of US lobbying expendi-
tures over the period 2000 to 2016 shows that climate lobbying expenditures of 
sectors engaged in the supply and use of fossil fuels greatly exceeded the ex-
penditures of environmental organisations and the renewable energy sector. 
InfluenceMap (2019) highlights the expenditures of major oil and gas firms on 
lobbying and argues that such lobbying was in conflict with the goals of the 
Paris Agreement. 27 See, for example, Nordhaus (2015). 
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of tipping points applies with respect to political mobilisation. Where a 
latent majority supports action to tackle climate change, and the size of a 
committed minority is close to a critical threshold, a small increase in 
political salience can have an outsized effect (Farmer et al., 2019). 
Emphasising and delivering short-run benefits for people and places 
Investments in clean innovation and assets will create opportunities 
for growth in new or growing markets, and associated gains in pro-
ductivity and resource efficiency. But in a context of unemployment due 
to the Covid-19 crisis, it will be important to deliver the rapid job- 
creation opportunities that can be generated by many low-carbon 
infrastructure investments and to realise and demonstrate the impor-
tance of the co-benefits of decarbonisation (including cleaner air, more 
liveable cities and associated health and wellbeing benefits). These will 
be key to the perception of climate action as an integral part of a strong 
and sustainable recovery where governments invest, and create the 
conditions for firms to invest in order to grow out of the crisis and the 
weak productivity performance that pre-dates it (Stern et al., 2020). 
Overall, research on the job implications of the transition to net-zero 
has generally concluded that it will be “a net generator of decent jobs” 
(UNEP, 2011), citing the spurring of “innovation, job creation and 
growth” (Fankhauser, et al., 2008). More recent analysis by Montt et al. 
(2018) finds that most economies will experience net job creation in the 
low-carbon transition. Blyth et al. (2014) review the literature and ex-
press reasonable confidence that low-carbon projects are indeed more 
labour intensive under conditions of suppressed aggregate demand (as is 
in the Covid-19 crisis), while cautioning that “‘job creation’ ceases to be 
a meaningful concept if economies are assumed to migrate towards 
equilibrium conditions”. However, even in a labour-market equilibrium 
the creation of employment opportunities that are more productive and 
cleaner, and hence “future-proofed” should be counted as a benefit. In 
the current context, investment in many areas of clean infrastructure is 
especially appealing because it is labour-intensive in the short run, and 
not susceptible to offshoring or imports. 
In recent work focused on the UK, Unsworth et al. (2020b) review the 
available ex-post and ex-ante evidence of the job-creation potential 
across key net-zero-aligned investments. The authors find that in-
vestments in clean automotive, hydrogen and carbon capture utilisation 
and storage, renewable energy, and housing energy efficiency can each 
generate tens of thousands of jobs across the UK while building pro-
ductive capacity for innovation-led growth in the medium to longer 
term. More broadly, these and other investments in the restoration of 
natural capital and active travel infrastructure will generate other 
attractive co-benefits including clean air, improved health and living 
standards. 
The net benefits in the transition will coexist with significant chal-
lenges for workers that are displaced, and firms that have to change their 
business models. Moreover, such impacts will be complex and multi-
faceted, going beyond narrow changes to jobs in the energy sector and 
impacting complex interrelated supply chains and secondary industries, 
while interacting with broader shocks and transitions related to Covid- 
19 and (potentially accelerated) automation (Autor and Reynolds, 
2020). Programmes of adult skilling and lifelong learning will be central 
to build labour market resilience and ensure that changing skills needs 
are met. Where such dislocations are focused on particular places then it 
will be important to increase investment in skills and opportunities for 
people in those places. 
Persistent and rising inequalities have been a feature in many 
advanced economies in recent years, and on some measures such in-
equalities are particularly pronounced in the UK. Evidence from suc-
cessful transitions in particular regions (see, for example, Sheldon et al., 
2018) suggests that local decision-making and delivery mechanisms that 
utilise the latest innovations in public participation, such as Citizens’ 
Assemblies, can help generate policies and projects for sustainable 
growth that are seen as fair and focused on local needs and perspectives. 
As discussed in Section 2, a robust carbon price is critical for reaching 
net-zero emissions, and creating the incentives for sustainable 
innovation-led growth. To date, even moderate attempts to increase fuel 
prices have been met with fierce opposition. A key example is the “Gilets 
Jaunes” movement in France, where an often-cited quote from a pro-
tester (“the elites are talking about the end of the world, while we are 
talking about the end of the month”28) highlights that tackling climate 
change is simply not a priority for many, in the presence of inequalities 
and feelings of neglect. Carbon pricing policies could gain stronger 
popular support if revenues were distributed across society in ways that 
are equitable and perceived to be so. How the proceeds are used is a 
political choice. Proponents of carbon pricing often advocate the return 
of tax revenues to consumers in a “citizen dividend”. There are strong 
arguments that targeting this at low-income households can build sup-
port. At the same time, the set of policies around carbon pricing should 
not be seen in isolation. A new and more inclusive form of growth, where 
the economic and broader co-benefits are understood and shared, can be 
a core element in overcoming the fraying of social cohesion seen in 
many countries in recent years. 
A longer-term vision 
While short-term gains are important, given the nature of political 
cycles, it will be crucial to build international and national support for a 
vision for a more sustainable, smarter and more inclusive future. Within 
nations, the management of change at the national and local levels will 
be critical to the necessary support. This will include organisational and 
financial action to enable change (such as retrofitting buildings) and 
facilitating alternative choices such as cycling, walking and public 
transport. 
Internationally, we can now see the quadruple wins to acting 
together. First, if all nations invest to expand investment and demand, 
then as Keynes made clear, all can see the benefits in demand and 
employment. Second, strong expectations of world growth can drive and 
sustain investment. Third, commitment to sustainable technologies fo-
cuses innovation and gives the scale to reduce costs. Fourth, we all 
benefit from reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and the support of 
biodiversity. As in recovery and rebuilding from the Second World War, 
this is a crucial period for international collaboration. 
Broad lessons on the political economy 
Conclusions for action: Attitudes and awareness of individuals, who 
are consumers and voters, shape and are shaped by, business and policy 
decisions. In order to enter a virtuous cycle where pro-environmental 
attitudes can facilitate and feed off the transition to net zero, a 
coherent and coordinated package of policies and investments must be 
both effectively implemented and communicated. Effective imple-
mentation will maximise the chances that clean innovation can benefit 
from its own path dependencies that will not only accelerate decar-
bonisation, but also bring costs down rapidly and help to neutralise 
resistance to change. Effective communication and participatory 
decision-making processes at the national and sub-national levels will 
help ensure that the economic (and broader) benefits of decarbonisation 
can be realised and shared, costs distributed fairly, and transitions 
actively managed. 
Conclusions for research: More research is needed to understand the 
political economy and behavioural dimensions that will foster the 
transition to net zero, both in terms of generating the political will to 
create the long-term, robust policy frameworks required to stimulate 
sustainable innovation and investments at scale, and also in terms of 
understanding how to improve the diffusion of existing cleaner products 
and services amongst consumers across the economy. It will be 
28 Translated from quotation in Rérolle (2018). 
N. Stern and A. Valero                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Research Policy 50 (2021) 104293
11
important to understand in more depth how citizens’ views on climate 
change and behaviour change have been shaped by the pandemic, and 
the most effective mechanisms for building consensus going forwards. 
Conclusions 
A sustainable and resilient recovery from the Covid-19 crisis will 
require boosted investments in clean innovation and its diffusion, 
together with complementary and inter-dependant investments in 
physical, human, natural and social capital. Such investments must be 
made quickly and at scale if the world is to meet the Paris 2015 UNFCCC 
target (“well below 2◦C”), raise ambition to keeping warming below 1.5 
oC and avoid catastrophic and irreversible damage (IPCC, 2018). 
The achievement of these objectives requires a whole-economy 
approach with strong, coordinated and long-term policies and in-
stitutions, providing credibility and direction for private investment. 
Multiple market failures that hold back clean innovation must be 
tackled. But change on the pace and scale necessary also requires a 
broader “missions” approach, appreciating also the importance of 
aligning all actors in the national and international innovation system. 
While institutional stability is required, policies must also be dynamic 
and able to adapt as new evidence emerges. We require “predictable 
flexibility” in policies so that expectations are strong and stable enough 
to support investment and innovation whilst also building in the 
learning which will be a crucial part of the process of change. 
While the body of theoretical and empirical work to date has pro-
vided important ideas, knowledge and recommendations for policy, it 
does not yet speak strongly enough to the urgency or mechanics of rapid 
action, or to the context of uncertainty. We hope that future work, across 
disciplines, can do so. 
This is an agenda for action and for research which Chris Freeman 
would have both shaped and urged. He was a leader in a generation that 
sought to build a better world after the destructions of the Second World 
War. He was a thinker who analysed how basic structures of the econ-
omy would have to change. Chris Freeman saw not only the importance 
of fundamental concepts to guide analysis and thinking about funda-
mental change, but also the importance of detailed and careful empirical 
work. He was a pioneer in creating ideas about the importance of 
institutional structures in delivering change and that these would have 
to be understood and created at all levels, from local to national and to 
international. Chris Freeman was an internationalist to the core of his 
being, both in value and in understanding the processes of change. And 
he saw, as someone who, in large measure, lived for the natural world, as 
a long-distance walker and an avid bird watcher and naturalist, the 
centrality of our environment, biodiversity and climate. This would have 
been a moment for Chris to lead. But, as we mark the hundredth anni-
versary of his birth, we are very fortunate to have the ideas and inspi-
ration of his work, of who he was, and of what he stood for, to guide us 
on our way. 
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